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Abstract
Recent research suggest that precise numbers signal confidence and are more potent anchors.
Political-administrative systems are often dominated by numerical information in order to eval-
uate performance or set future goals. We conduct a set of experiments testing how well the
precision effect translates in political-administrative setting (n=1,505). The findings provide no
clear convincing evidence of a precision effect. Citizens evaluation of performance goal num-
bers seem to be largely unaffected by the roundness or precision of a number. This is the case
even if the numerical information is presented without any explicit political cues or are framed
as non-manipulative expert judgments.
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“A false impression of accuracy can be created by quoting statistics in greater detail
than is warranted by their precision or by overloading indicators with detail. [...] often
used by politicians to impress with their grasp of detail...”
– Robert V. Horn (1993: 18)
Politics and administration are often a battle over numbers. Political-administrative actors state
all sorts of facts, expectations, forecasts, or goals in order to win political arguments and gain
support for their policies (Prewitt, 1987). Some have suggested that politicians might benefit from
inflating their stated confidence about outcomes (Wildavsky, 1964; Radzevick & Moore, 2011).
Recent research point to that one way of increasing others’ confidence in numbers is by using
precise numbers (Janiszewski & Uy, 2008; Thomas et al. 2010; Mason et al., 2013; Jerez-Fernandez
et al., 2013; Zhang & Schwarts 2013). For instance, Mason et al.(2013) find that precise offers in
negotiations are perceived as more informed which prompts less adjustment away from precise
offers compared with round ones. In general, using any type of number has been found to boost
citizens competence rating of politicians (Pedersen, 2017), even though performance information
research find that citizens themselves are more affected by episodic information than statistical
information in their overall performance assessment (Olsen, 2017).
In political-administrative settings, politicians and managers are the producers of numbers while
citizens are the potential receivers (Yanic & Foster 1995; 1997; Radzevick & Moore 2011). If
individuals prefer precise estimates it gives number producers strong incentives to supply precision
(Radzevick & Moore 2011; Jerez-Fernandez et al. 2013). If citizens prefer precision over vagueness
it has very straightforward implications for how politicians should use numbers: be as precise as
possible. Overly confident people tend to gain more influence (Koehler et al. 2002) and this effect
could extend into politics. The open question is if “misplaced concreteness” (Horn, 1993: 18) and
“specious accuracy” (Morgenstern, 1950: 3) in the form of precise political-administrative numbers
can affect citizens in the same way as found in the market place?
In this article, we bring the recent insights on number precision in a market setting into the
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realm of politics. Across a set experiments we test how precise political-administrative numbers
affect citizens trust in forecasts, confidence in political-administrative decisions, and the likelihood
of achieving future performance goals. The paper hereby adds to the discussion in performance
management on the use and effect of performance data and goals (Moynihan 2005; Rutherford and
Meier, 2016) and provides a potential piece in the puzzle of why managers use not only performance
data but even highly precise performance metrics (Moynihan and Pandey 2010).
Should we expect citizens to view precise political numbers as cue of confidence? Zhang and
Schwarts (2012; 2013) find that the precision effect depends on the receivers beliefs about the
producers cooperativeness. That is, precision has no effect if the producer is viewed as untrustwor-
thy, self-interested, or incompetent. They draw on Grice (1975) conversational logic which state
that speakers apply a level of precision which reflects the accuracy of their knowledge. Hence the
conversational norm in corporative conversations is to use less precision if uncertainty surround a
numerical value.
In a market place setting sellers or buyers might suspect that the conversational norms are
broken in order achieve certain goals by signaling a high degree of certainty (Mason et al. 2013).
Mason et al. (2013) speculate that precision can backfire if the receiver of judgment questions
the producers motives or expertise. There are also good reasons for citizens to be skeptical about
the numbers which policy makers present. Previous research highlight that politicians can exploit
cognitive biases in citizens processing of numbers (Krishna & Slemrod, 2003; Malhotra & Margalit,
2010; Olsen, 2013a; 2013b).
Data on Three Experiments
The precision effect is tested across three independent experiments embedded in a single survey.
Respondents for the survey were recruited via YouGov’s Danish online panel (n=1505). All re-
spondents are between the age of 18 to 74 and the sample is highly diverse in terms of age (M =
51.0, SD = 14.8), gender (49.6% female), education, and political party identification. Following
an introductory screen the respondents were randomly assigned to two of the three different ex-
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periments. The respondents were split in two groups for experiment 1 and 2 while all respondents
where assigned to one of multiple conditions in the third experiment.
Experiment 1: Choosing among Economic Predictions
Governments and many other actor produce a large amount of forecast about economics and fiscal
performance of political jurisdictions. Point of departure for the first experiment is to test if citizens
have greater trust in precise numerical forecasts compared with less precise ones?
Method
One half of the participants (n=749) were asked to choose between two different predictions about
three different dimensions of the Danish economy in 2014. They were asked to chose the one they
trusted the most. The dimensions covered (a) economic growth rate, (b) reduction in the number
of unemployed, and (c) the state budget deficit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions of the three dimensions. In the first condition the two predictions were a round number
and a precise number slightly below the round numbers. For economic growth 1.5% and 1.463%,
for number of unemployed: 10,000 people or 8,750 people, and for the state budget deficit 20
billion (DKK) and 19,63 billion (DKK). In the second condition the participants got the same round
number along with a precise prediction of equivalent distance but slightly above the round estimate.
All in the same order of magnitude as in the lower precise condition. The order of sequence of the
three prediction topics was also randomized.
Results
The overall results of the experiment is reported in figure 1. For the growth rate 51.6 pct. prefer
the lower estimate of 1.463% over 1.5% (Exact binomial test (n=368), p = .56). However, 76.4%
prefer 1.5% if paired with the higher precise estimate (Exact binomial test (n=381), p < .001).
For the case of unemployment reduction 72.8% pick the lower precise estimates over the round
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(Exact binomial test (n=381), p < .001). However, 78.5% picked the round estimate when paired
with a higher precise estimate (Exact binomial test (n=368), p < .001). Finally, for the state budget
deficit there was a preference for the round estimate. When paired with a lower precise estimate
54.9% chose the round estimate of 20 billion (Exact binomial test (n=381), p = .068) and when
paired with a higher precise estimate 57.7% picked the 20 billion (Exact binomial test (n=368), p
= .003). In summary, across all three scenarios no evidence point to that respondents mostly trust
the precise estimate over the round one. In fact, respondents mostly choose the estimate with a
negative outlook on the economy and with slight preference for round estimates. The fomer might
indicate some motivated reasoning in numerical interpretation with a directional goal to discredit
the current government (Baekgaard and Serritzlew 2016).
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Figure 1: Do citizens prefer precise or round forcasts of the economy? (N=750)
Experiment 2: Confidence in Policy Information
In the second experiment we test how citizens rate their confidence in political-administrative num-
bers if precise and round estimates are evaluated in isolation. Asking respondents to rate their
confidence in precise and round numbers is inspired by Jerez-Fernandez et al. (2013).
Method
Half of the participants (n=756) were asked to evaluate the information which informs various
political decisions. They were asked to rate their degree of confidence in the correctness of the
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information on a 11-point scale which ranged from 0 (no confidence) to 10 (Very much confidence).
They provided their rating for three different pieces of political information. The first condition
contained political information with a round number while the second condition contained a precise
number drawn from a pre-defined uniform distribution narrowly centered around the round number.
One policy information stated that “The budget unit finds that the municipality needs to save
1,000 DKK per capita.”. In the precise condition the DKK amount was randomly drawn from a
uniform distribution ranging from 901 DKK to 1,099 DKK (excluding 1,000 DKK). Another policy
information was that “Experts find that economic growth in Denmark will be at 1.5% in 2014” with
precise estimates ranging from 1.401% to 1.599% (excluding 1.5%). Finally, a statement stated
that “The Government expect the unemployment rate will decrease by 10.000 people in 2014” with
precise estimates ranging from 9,001 to 10,999 (excluding 10.000). The order of presentation of the
scenarios was also randomized and participants receive only three precise estimates or three round
estimates.
Results
Results of all three scenarios is shown in figure 2. First, for the municipal budget cuts the average
confidence is 4.7 for both precise and round estimates (t(754) = .38, p = .70, d = 0.06). Second,
for the decrease in unemployment average confidence is also not significantly different at 3.8 for
both frames (t(754) = .42, p = .67, d = 0.08). Finally, for the case of the growth rates respondent
have significantly more confidence in the round estimate (M= 5.2, SD= 2.2) than the precise one
(M= 4.8, SD= 2.3), t(754) = 2.5, p = .013, d = 0.42. Across all three scenarios we find either no
difference between respondents confidence in precise and round estimates or in fact a higher degree
of confidence in round estimates.
Experiment 3: The Likelihood of Achieving Policy Goals
Long-term policy goals seem to play an important role in politics. However, citizens may be skep-
tical about politicians ability and willingness to achieve goals that are beyond their own electoral
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Figure 2: Evaluation of the information which informs political decisions. How much confidence do you have in the
correctness of this information? 11-point scale which ranged from 0 (no confidence) to 10 (Very much confidence).
Error bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals. N=756.
career. In addition, these simple quantifiable goals often measure complex societal outcomes which
can be difficult to affect, e.g., national wealth, the educational level of the population, or human
health etc. In the final experiment we induce both more ambiguity and uncertainty into the polit-
ical numbers by looking at long term policy goals. In addition, we also vary the communicators
expertise and potential manipulative interests in presenting the numbers (Zhang & Schwatz 2012;
2013).
Method
All participants (n=1505) were assigned to one of two descriptions outlining how politicians set
policy goals. The first framed emphasized that many policy goals often are set with the purpose of
convincing the electorate: “The political goals are often set with the help from political consultants
who knows how to convince voters.”. This frame was intended to induce the idea that policy be
manipulative and non-cooperative. The second frame emphasized the scientific soundness of many
policy goals: “The political goals are often set with the help from scientific experts who have great
professional knowledge about the topics.” This frame aimed at highlighting how policy goals can
rest on expert judgment with non-manipulative intend. Given the existing research we would expect
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that precise policy goals only affect citizens more if they are provided by non-manipulative humans
with some expertise (Zhang & Schwatz 2012; 2013).
Participants read three policy goals in random order. For each frame participants were either
assigned three policy goals with a round number or three policy goals with a precise number. The
participants were also only assigned to either manipulative or expert frames. The goals varied in
terms of policy area and goal precision. The three goals in the round number frame were: (a) “By
2020 renewable energy must make up at least 30% of the total energy consumption., (b) By 2020
public service expenditure must make up no more than 25% of the total economy, and (c) By 2020
employment must be increased by at least 200.000 people. In the precise frame the numbers were
drawn from a predefined distribution of round numbers in order to make the results robust the dif-
ferent types of “precise” numbers. The energy policy goal was drawn from the interval 29.01%
to 30.99% and reported with two decimals (e.g., 29.67%). The public expenditure interval was
24.01% to 25.99% and also reported with two decimals (e.g., 25.34%). Finally, the employment
goal was restricted to the interval of 191,001 to 209,999. Participants were asked to rate the likeli-
hood of achieving the stated policy goals on unnumbered slider scale (101-point scale ranging from
0 indicating “Not at all likely” to 100 “Very likely”).
Results
The overall results of the experiment is reported in figure 3. On average citizens assign greater
likelihood to the goals of renewable energy (M=58.4, SD=22.4) than in the two different economic
goals (employment: M=40.6, SD=21.4; public expenditure: M=42.7, SD=19.3). This fits the idea
that energy policy is less politicized in Denmark. For all three scenarios we conducted a 2 (num-
bers: round vs. precise) × 2 (frame: manipulative vs. expertise) between subjects ANOVA with
an interaction. For the case of the renewable energy goal there is no significant interaction effect
(F(1, 1501) = .59, p = .44) but some evidence of significant main effects in the opposite direction
(F(1, 1505) = 3.11, p = .078). For the employment numbers there is also no significant interaction
effect (F(1, 1501) = 1.16, p = .28). There is a small positive main effect of receiving the expertise
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frame (F(1, 1501) = 4.7, p = .029), but no main effect of number precision (F(1, 1501) = 0.02, p
= .90). Finally, for the case of the public expenditure goal there is again no significant interaction
effect (F(1, 1501) = .19, p = .66). There is also no main effect of the expertise frame (F(1, 1501)
= .80, p = .37). However, we do find a positive main effect of number precision on citizens likeli-
hood evaluation (F(1, 1501) = 8.42, p < .01). On average precise public expenditure goals receive
an evaluation of 44.1 (SD= 18.7) while round. However, we should take theses results with some
skepticism as the main effect of manipulative vs. expertise frame is close to zero which could in-
dicate that the study failed to manipulate the cues about the information provider. This being said,
most responded were able to recall the correct information provider 1
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Figure 3: The likelihood of achieving the stated policy goals. A 101-point scale ranging from 0 indicating “Not at all
likely” to 100 “Very likely”. Error bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals. N=1505.
Discussion and Conclusion
The three experiments reported on here aimed at extending research on number precision as a
confidence cue in a political-administrative setting (Janiszewski & Uy 2008, Thomas et al. 2010,
Mason et al., 2013, Jerez-Fernandez et al., 2013, Zhang & Schwarts 2013). Across all experiments,
including multiple different scenarios, we found no clear evidence of a precision effect in politics.
1At the end of the survey participants were asked to recall who usually provided politicians with goals according to the
question they were exposed to earlier on. A list was provided with the two actual treatment options (political advisors
or scientific experts) along with two unmentioned sources (party members and politicians from other countries) and
a don’t know option. 57,9% or 872 respondents provided a correct recall of the treatment they got. The substantial
results of the interaction effects are not altered if only those reporting the right recall are included in the analysis.
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In most instances the respondents did not rely on the roundness or precision of the numbers in their
judgment. Citizenss do not report greater trust or confidence in precise political numbers. They
do not judge precise performance goals to be more likely to be achieved. And the effect does not
depend on the motives of the goal provider as found in a market setting (Zhang & Schwarts 2012;
2013). Only for the case of numerical goals for future public expenditure did we find evidence of
a small precision effect. It can be argued that the public expenditure measure is more difficult to
encode and less often discussed in political debates. This may indicate that precision can play a
role for numerical measures where citizens are more politically ambivalent.
This is by no means a definitive study of precision in political-administrative settings. A possi-
ble explanation for the null finding may be that participants did not accept that the estimates were
produced by a another human which is important for a social attribution explanation (Zhang &
Schwarts, 2012; 2013; Jerez-Fernandez et al., 2013). That is, we could suspect that citizens which
actively interact with others to seek out political advice would be more vulnerable to a precision
effect. However, the findings do suggest that precision cues are fragile outside of a market setting.
This point to that future research should look more into how the absence or presence of other cues
crowds out the precision of a number as a relevant cues for citizens, voters, buyers, and all the other
important roles in which humans on a daily basis make judgment about numerosities.
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Appendix
Study 1: Experimental design
Please evaluate different predictions about the Danish economy in 2014.
Which one of these statements do you trust the most?
The economic growth rate will be: a) 1.463% or b) 1.5%.
The unemployment rate in Denmark will decrease by: a) 8.750 people or b) 10.000 people
The state budget deficit will end up at: a) 19.63 bio. (DKK) or b) 20. bio. (DKK).
Figure 4: Example screen from experiment 1
Study 2: Experimental design
Please evaluate the information which informs political decisions.
How much confidence do you have in the correctness of this information?
The budget unit finds that the municipality needs to save 1.000 DKK per capita.
Experts find that economic growth in Denmark will be at 1.5% in 2014
The Government expect the unemployment rate will decrease by 10.000 people in 2014
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Figure 5: Example screen from experiment 2
14
Study 3: Experimental design
The politicians set many goals for how Denmark should develop in the future.
The political goals are often set with the help from political consultants who knows how to
convince voters.
OR
The political goals are often set with the help from scientific experts who have great professional
knowledge about the topics.
How likely do you believe it is that the following goal is achieved?
By 2020 must renewable energy make up at least 30% of the total energy consumption.
By 2020 must public service expenditure make up no more than 25% of the totale economy
By 2020 must employment be increased by at least 200.000 people.
Figure 6: Example screen from experiment 3
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